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Abstract	  
	  
Autonomy of state agencies: A Scandinavian style?  
NPM-doctrines states that ideal-type agencies should have a high level of managerial 
autonomy, while being controlled through result-based control instruments, like 
performance contracts. In this article, the authors present a first preliminary attempt to 
comparatively analyze the autonomy of state agencies in four Nordic countries: 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. By using survey data from more than 500 
state agencies in the four countries, the article analyses whether there is indeed a 
Scandinavian style of autonomy and result control and assesses which structural, 
cultural, and environmental variables might explain similarities and differences in the 
autonomy of agencies.  
 
Outline of paper: 
1. Introduction and research questions 
2. The Nordic context  
3. Theory 
4. Data and methods 
5. Findings 
6. Discussion 
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1. Introduction and research questions 
 
 
One of the key features of the public management reforms of advanced economies in 
the previous decades has been an attempt to create semi-autonomous public agencies 
and thus transform the traditional hierarchy of public bureaucracies (Verhoest, 
Roness, Verschuere, Rubecksen, and MacCarthaigh 2010). This process of 
agencification (Pollitt and Talbot 2004) has been a prominent part of the New Public 
Management (NPM) movement since the 1980ies (Hood 1991). 
 
In this paper we explore to what extent global ideas of agencification has been 
adopted in the Nordic national administration and we explore possible antecedents for 
variation in the patterns of adoption in four Nordic countries. Agencification imply 
both that organizational units gain more autonomy to let the managers manage and 
more result control to make the managers manage. In this paper we focus primarily on 
the former. We analyze the degree of autonomy of Nordic State agencies and we 
explore the antecedents related to more or less autonomy. 
More specifically we ask: 
1. How does the autonomy of government agencies vis-à-vis their minister and 
parent department compare across the Nordic countries? 
2. How can we explain variations in the autonomy of government agencies in the 
Nordic countries? 
 
Though informed by the notions of global processes of diffusion from the sociological 
institutionalism (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997) and the notions of local 
path dependencies from the historical institutionalism (Thelen 1999), our approach is 
basically exploratory. We presume that simultaneous processes of diffusion of global 
agencification ideas as well as translation or even rejection due to different 
institutional settings take place. But we don’t have strong presumptions concerning 
which Nordic contexts would be more prone to agencification ideologies than others.   
 
The paper is our first take and any suggestions for improvement are very welcome.  
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In what follows we first provide a short presentation of the Nordic context (section 2) 
followed by a review of theory and previous research (section 3). We then present the 
methods and data used in the analysis (section 4) followed by a section of 
(preliminary) findings (section 5). In the end we provide a short discussion (section 
6).  
 
2. The Nordic context  
 
In comparative perspective, the Nordic countries are particularly interesting since they 
display a high degree of similarity on a number of key political and societal 
dimensions. At the same time, they present striking differences in terms of the 
organization of the state administration (Hansen, Lægreid, Pierre, and Salminen 
2012).  
The Nordic countries are all comparatively small, open, and affluent market 
economies. They are relatively homogenous countries with consolidated democracies 
and comparatively high economic equality. The Nordic countries are also 
characterized by large universal welfare states and an egalitarian culture with low 
acceptance of power distance. Generally speaking the Nordic political-administrative 
culture is characterized by high	  level	  of	  mutual	  trust	  between	  political	  and	  
administrative	  executives. Most importantly in the present context, all the Nordic 
countries have an old and well-established system of central agencies but also a strong 
international orientation, and thus all have been exposed to the reform ideas 
associated with NPM and agencification. 
However, the Nordic countries also differ in several important aspects. Perhaps the 
most important difference when analyzing state agencies relates to the institutional 
models that historically have characterized Nordic state administration. In the most 
recent comparative Nordic project on this topic, a significant difference between an 
East Nordic (Finland and Sweden) and a West Nordic (Denmark and Norway) 
administrative model was emphasized. The East Nordic model is a dualistic model 
with strong autonomous central agencies and a government where central agencies 
report to the cabinet, not to a superior ministry. The West Nordic model, by contrast, 
is more monistic with closer ties between central agencies and the parent ministry 
through the principle of ministerial responsibility. Furthermore, there are some 
important differences in their relations to international organizations such as EU. 
 
Agencification	  in	  the	  Nordic	  countries	  began	  long	  before	  NPM	  reform	  hit	  the	  
shores	  of	  the	  Nordic	  region.	  This	  means	  that	  NPM	  reform	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	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1990s,	  which	  was	  implemented	  rather	  modestly	  in	  the	  region,	  took	  aim	  at	  
changing	  the	  behaviour	  of	  already	  existing	  organization	  rather	  than,	  as	  was	  the	  
case	  in	  many	  other	  countries,	  launching	  executive	  agencies.	  	  
In	  the	  first	  decades	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  all	  the	  Nordic	  countries	  
witnessed	  a	  significant	  expansion	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  welfare	  state,	  triggering	  a	  set	  
of	  challenges	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  public	  sector	  in	  general	  and	  the	  state	  
administration	  in	  particular.	  One	  response	  to	  the	  challenge	  was	  decentralization	  
and	  delegation	  from	  state	  to	  regional	  and	  local	  government.	  Another	  response	  
was	  various	  versions	  of	  agencification	  of	  the	  state	  administration.	  This	  
agencification	  process	  was	  significantly	  affected	  by	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  
East	  and	  West	  Nordic	  traditions	  for	  organizing	  state	  administration.	  In	  Finland	  
and	  Sweden	  there	  is	  a	  stronger	  historical	  tradition	  for	  autonomous	  state	  
agencies	  compared	  to	  Norway	  and	  Denmark.	  However,	  in	  all	  four	  countries	  a	  
process	  of	  agencification	  took	  place	  before	  the	  NPM	  reform	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  
1990s	  (Hansen,	  Lægreid,	  Pierre,	  and	  Salminen	  2012).	  
	  
Based	  on	  this	  account	  of	  the	  Nordic	  context	  one	  should	  expect	  more	  autonomy	  in	  
Finnish	  and	  Swedish	  state	  agencies	  than	  in	  Danish	  and	  Norwegian.	  
 
3. Theory and previous research 
	  
In	  this	  section	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  theory	  and	  previous	  research	  in	  organizational	  
agencification	  in	  public	  administration	  is	  given.	  Our	  basic	  question	  to	  previous	  
research	  is	  if	  there	  are	  any	  clues	  in	  the	  existing	  academic	  literature	  concerning	  
what	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  find	  concerning	  variations	  in	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  
Nordic	  state	  agencies.	  
	  
As mentioned in the introduction, though informed by the notions of global processes 
of diffusion from the sociological institutionalism (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and 
Ramirez 1997) and the notions of local path dependencies from the historical 
institutionalism (Thelen 1999), our approach is basically exploratory. We are not sure 
what we should expect to find. But in this section we examine what previous research 
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has produced in terms of speculations of causal processes and empirical evidence 
related to our subject. 
 
[This section needs to be written] 
 
 
 
4. Data and methods of analysis 
	  
The	  empirical	  analysis	  is	  based	  on	  data	  generated	  in	  web	  surveys	  carried	  out	  in	  
Norway	  in	  2004,	  in	  Sweden,	  between	  the	  end	  of	  November	  2008	  and	  the	  beginning	  
of	  April	  2009,	  in	  Denmark,	  between	  the	  end	  of	  April	  and	  the	  end	  of	  June	  2009	  
(Hansen,	  Jensen,	  and	  Pedersen	  2010)	  and	  in	  Finland	  in	  the	  autumn	  2009.	  	  
 
The questionnaires where to a large extent based on the COBRA items (Common 
Public Organization Data Base for Research and Analysis) (Verhoest 2009). The 
COBRA network	  were	  initiated	  by	  Guy	  B.	  Peters	  and	  Geert	  Bouckaert	  in	  2001	  and	  it	  
offers	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  compare	  public	  administration	  systems	  in	  different	  
countries.	  Apart	  from	  the	  four	  countries	  at	  hand,	  the	  survey	  has	  also	  been	  carried	  
out	  in	  many	  other	  countries	  such	  as	  the	  Netherlands,	  Germany,	  Ireland,	  Belgium,	  
Italy,	  Australia,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Switzerland,	  Rumania,	  and	  Lithuania.	  
 
The	  population	  in	  all	  four	  countries	  where	  state	  agencies	  with	  some	  kind	  of	  
hierarchically	  subordinated	  relation	  to	  a	  ministerial	  department.	  However,	  the	  
exact	  interpretation	  of	  this	  criterion	  varies	  somewhat	  between	  the	  four	  surveys.	  
The	  response	  rate	  was	  reasonably	  high	  in	  all	  four	  countries:	  More	  than	  60	  %	  in	  
Denmark,	  [Ari	  and	  Kristin	  could	  you	  insert	  for	  Finland	  and	  Norway	  here?]	  and	  
more	  than	  70	  %	  in	  Sweden	  for	  most	  items	  (Hansen	  and	  Andersen	  2012;	  Hansen,	  
Jensen,	  and	  Pedersen	  2010;	  Niklasson	  2009;	  Niklasson	  2012).	  
	  
In the analysis in the present paper we have constructed two summative indexes as 
indicators for our theoretical concept of autonomy: One index (four variables) for 
financial autonomy and one index (two variables) for policy autonomy (see table 1).  
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Table 1: Survey facts and information of the variables in the two autonomy indexes 
 Denmark Finland Norway Sweden 
Survey year 2009 2009 2004 2009 
Number of respondents 175 93 155 254 
Variables included in two autonomy indexes 
Financial autonomy: Can your 
organization itself take loans? 
0=No; 1=Yes;  
Financial autonomy: Can your 
organization itself set tariffs? 
0=No; 1=Yes;  
Financial autonomy: Can your 
organization itself shift personnel 
and running costs budgets and 
investment budgets? 
0=No; 1=Yes;  
 
Financial autonomy: Can your 
organization itself shift between 
budgets of different years? 
0=No; 1=Yes;  
 
Policy autonomy: 
Choice of policy instruments 
4 point scale: 0=parent ministry most decisions; 
0,33=parent ministry after consultation; 
0,66=organization under or after consultation; 
1=organization or with minor restrictions 
Policy autonomy: 
Who decide on organizations 
tasks? 
4 point scale: 0=parent ministry most decisions; 
0,33=parent ministry after consultation; 
0,66=organization under or after consultation; 
1=organization or with minor restrictions 
 
In both indexes 0 indicates the lowest possible autonomy, while 1 indicates the 
highest possible autonomy: Thus the higher the value the more autonomy of the 
organization. 
Our indexes should be perceived as formative indexes rather than reflective 
(Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006). Thus lack of positive correlation between the 
variables included in an index does not represent a problem to the validity of the 
indexes.  
But the correlation of the variables and the indexes they constitute may still provide 
useful information concerning how different dimensions of autonomy are related. 
Below is presented the bivariate pearson correlations of the dependent variables of 
our empirical analysis (table 2). As can be seen from the table all variables correlate 
positively and most variables correlate significantly at a 99% level. However the four 
variables of the financial autonomy index show a rather weak positive correlation, 
which is also indicated by a low Cronbachs alpha value of 0,49 as contrasted to the 
policy autonomy index with a Cronbachs alpha value of 0,72 (shown in italics in the 
table).  
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Table 2: Bivariate Pearson Correlations of autonomy variables 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Index Policy Autonomy 0,72 ,313 ,855 ,909 ,259 ,291 ,115 ,129 
2. Index Financial Autonomy ,313 0,49 ,312 ,247 ,632 ,673 ,659 ,544 
3. PA1: who decides on organizations' tasks? ,855 ,312 1 ,561 ,268 ,258 ,131 ,134 
4. PA2: choice of policy instruments ,909 ,247 ,561 1 ,201 ,258 ,076 ,096* 
5. FA1: take loans ,259 ,632 ,268 ,201 1 ,296 ,243 ,101* 
6. FA2: set tariffs ,291 ,673 ,258 ,258 ,296 1 ,240 ,130 
7. FA3: shift personnel-running cost and  
investments budgets ,115 ,659 ,131 ,076 ,243 ,240 1 ,157 
8. FA4: Can your organization itself shift  
between  the budgets of different years ,129 ,544 ,134 ,096* ,101* ,130 ,157 1 
Bold. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Cronbachs alpha values for indexes shown in italics 
 
Table 1 and 2 present some basic information of the dependent variables of the 
analysis and in the following analyses we will use the two indexes of policy and 
financial autonomy.  
 
Concerning independent variables we use three groups of variables.  
Since our main concern is country level differences we have constructed dummy 
variables for each of the four countries.  
Since the tasks of the agencies may also be significantly related to autonomy we use 
four task variables: Policy formulation; Regulation/control; Other public authority 
tasks and general public services. 
Since the size of the state agencies vary significantly between countries and since size 
may also in itself be related to autonomy, we have constructed dummy variables of 
the number of employees in the organization: Up to ten employees; 11-20 employees; 
21-50 employees; 51 or more employees. 
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Descriptive statistics of the variables included in the analysis can be seen in table 3. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
      
 
N Mean Med. Std. Dev. Min Max 
Index Policy Autonomy two items alpha 0,72 547 0,85 0,83 0,17 0,17 1 
Index Financial Autonomy four items alpha 0,49 516 0,47 0,5 0,30 0 1 
Norway 677 0,23 0 0,42 0 1 
Finland 677 0,14 0 0,34 0 1 
Sweden 677 0,38 0 0,48 0 1 
Denmark 677 0,26 0 0,44 0 1 
Policy formulation as (primary or secondary) task? 570 0,16 0 0,37 0 1 
Regulation/scrutiny/control/inspection  
(primary or secondary) task? 570 0,37 0 0,48 0 1 
Other kinds of exercising public authority  
(primary or secondary) task? 568 0,36 0 0,48 0 1 
General public services (primary or secondary) 
task? 576 0,82 1 0,38 0 1 
Organization with up to 10 employees 677 0,08 0 0,28 0 1 
Organization with between 11 and 20 employees 677 0,08 0 0,27 0 1 
Organization with between 21 and 50 employees 677 0,11 0 0,32 0 1 
        
5. Findings 
 
In table 4 a multivariate OLS regression analysis of our findings is presented.  
Our findings indicate that country level differences are significantly related to 
differences in the autonomy of state agencies. 
Sweden seems to be the country with most autonomy for the state agencies while 
Norway according to this analysis is the country with the least financial autonomy and 
Finland is the country with least policy autonomy. 
The tasks of the agencies seem to be significantly related to financial autonomy but 
not to policy autonomy. State agencies providing general public services seem to have 
significantly more financial autonomy than state agencies conducting regulation, 
control or other public authority tasks. 
Concerning the size of the state agencies as measured by number of full time 
employees, the small state agencies with up to 10 employees seem to have 
significantly less financial autonomy but significantly more policy autonomy. 
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Table	  4:	  Regression	  analysis	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  policy	  and	  financial	  autonomy	  for	  Nordic	  
state	  agencies	  
Multiple	  OLS	  regression	   Index	  1	  	  
Policy	  
Autonomy	  
Index	  2	  	  
Financial	  
Autonomy	  
1.	  Norway	   -­‐,348***	   -­‐,533***	  
2.	  Finland	   -­‐,388***	   -­‐,358***	  
3.	  Denmark	   -­‐,002	   -­‐,184***	  
4.	  Sweden	   Ref	   Ref	  
5.	  Policy	  formulation	   -­‐,008	   -­‐,010	  
6.	  Regulation/control	   -­‐,067^	   -­‐,193***	  
7.	  Other	  public	  authority	  tasks	   -­‐,046	   -­‐,170***	  
8.	  General	  public	  services	   Ref	   Ref	  
9.	  Size:	  Up	  to	  10	  employees	   ,085*	   -­‐,089*	  
10.	  Size:	  11-­‐20	  employees	   ,046	   -­‐,026	  
11.	  Size:	  21-­‐50	  employees	   ,071^	   ,006	  
12.	  Size:	  51	  or	  more	  employees	   Ref	   Ref	  
N	   531	   506	  
R2	   0,213	   0,265	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0,200	   0,252	  
Note: Standardized regression coefficients.  
Level	  of	  significance	  marked	  as:	  ^p<0.1	  *p<0.05	  **p<0.01	  ***p<0.001	  
 
Looking at the R2, the model accounts for 21 % of the variation in policy autonomy 
and 27 % of the variation in financial autonomy. Most of this variation is accounted 
for by the country level differences. 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The findings presented in the previous section are preliminary and need to be further 
examined. But if we take them at face value we have some interesting results.  
 
First it seems like the distinction between an East and a West Nordic model is not 
appropriate for predicting differences in the autonomy of state agencies. According to 
our findings Danish and Swedish state agencies tend to have more autonomy than 
their Finnish and Norwegian counterparts. And in terms of financial autonomy, the 
Swedish state agencies have more autonomy than any of the other Nordic countries. 
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Second, national traditions rather than the size of the organization and its tasks seem 
to be the most important predictor of variation in the autonomy of state agencies.  
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